This essay was written with Cindy Cohn, and originally appeared in Lawfare.

One of the many legacies of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 is the government-wide shift from targeted surveillance—such as individual wiretaps or pen register/trap and trace orders—to mass surveillance techniques—such as tapping into the internet backbone or mass collection of telephone or internet metadata. The legal and technical architecture of modern mass surveillance, initially framed as a necessary defense against terrorist threats, has grown far beyond that justification and national security in general. Mass surveillance is now a routine tool used by law enforcement. ICE uses it in immigration actions and against people exercising their First Amendment rights to protest. It’s also increasingly part of private security systems, such as facial recognition at venues such as Madison Square Garden and networked Flock license plate capture systems on roads and in parking lots.

The interrelation between private and governmental mass surveillance is worth examining. Surveillance is the business model of the internet; companies like Google and Facebook constantly spy on their users’ behavior. From the National Security Agency relying on data collected by telecommunication and internet companies, to local sheriffs and ICE agents relying on cellphone location data and privately managed automatic license plate readers, governments primarily obtain the mass surveillance information through private companies. Increasingly, access doesn’t just come through legal processes, either. FBI Director Kash Patel recently confirmed in congressional testimony that the agency is purchasing information on Americans from data brokers and intends to continue to do so.

This pipeline from private collection to governmental collection means that as companies collect more information for surveillance capitalism purposes, more is available to law enforcement as well. And as the technology for mass surveillance and analysis improves, especially with the increased use of AI technologies, the problems attendant to mass surveillance grow as well.

After 9/11, the idea that the government could surveil the population to safety took hold. In 2001, the fear of terrorism reached a frequency and intensity never before seen. Along with that came the fear that the enemy could be anyone, anywhere. As a result, the government’s response was to watch everyone, everywhere. This line of reasoning underpinned the shift from targeted to mass surveillance. Or, in the words of an internal National Security Agency (NSA) presentation that was made public as part of Edward Snowden’s 2013 disclosures, a government that can “Collect it All,” “Process it All,” “Exploit it All,” “Partner it All,” and “Sniff it All,” will ultimately, “Know it All.” Similar rationales support the rise of domestic mass surveillance: if law enforcement could see and hear everything, it could more effectively interdict and solve serious crimes.

The national security community has never provided a full analysis of the costs and benefits of these mass surveillance programs, either in terms of taxpayer dollars or diversion of resources from other efforts—or any demonstration that those techniques stopped attacks that otherwise they would not have been able to prevent. While the NSA occasionally presents examples of the successes due to its mass surveillance programs, especially when those techniques are under public pressure, the examples also regularly fall apart upon serious scrutiny. And even if some utility exists, it must be seriously weighed against the costs.

Similarly, there has never been any comprehensive analysis about whether domestic immigration or law enforcement’s use of these techniques actually makes people safer, or whether other techniques could produce the same results. Instead, both the police and the companies selling these tools float anecdotes and dubious data. For example, Flock’s data equates the number of law enforcement hits in their database with actually solving crimes.

Twenty-five years after 9/11, it seems reasonable to step back and evaluate the costs of this shift to mass surveillance, especially in terms of Americans’ rights and freedoms.

The Shift

The easiest place to see a shift to mass surveillance was in the government’s decision immediately after 9/11 to collect Americans’ telephone records. The program started under an argument of pure executive power as the “President’s Surveillance Program.” But in 2006, that argument secretly shifted to a novel interpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot. Act which had only previously authorized more targeted access to record. While some media and public interest organizations struggled to force the government to reveal the program as early as late 2005, the government only officially confirmed it after the 2013 Snowden disclosures. In 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government’s interpretation of Section 215 as allowing mass collection of telephone records. Later the same year, Congress passed the USA Freedom Act. While this new law still allows collection of a tremendous amount of domestic telephone records, it ended the indiscriminate mass collection that had occurred for nearly fourteen years.

Other shifts to mass surveillance continue through today. The NSA launched its Upstream program, which involved intercepting both metadata and content from key telecommunications junctures inside the U.S., soon after 9/11. It was also initially conducted under a claim of purely presidential authority. This program was brought under marginal congressional and programmatic (not targeted) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court review via Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. In 2017, more than15 years after its inception, the NSA ended content searches due to FISA court pressure, but the mass collection continues.

Despite the stated goal of conducting mass spying only on people outside the U.S.—which itself is problematic given international law’s requirement that surveillance be both necessary and proportionate—mass surveillance collects a tremendous amount of U.S. persons’ communications. This can happen because people communicate with people abroad, or because of overcollection—when government agencies gather far more personal data on non-targeted US persons than authorized by law. The concerns about collecting Americans’ data on U.S. soil led Congress to allow the program to officially expire in 2026, although the previously-approved mass surveillance itself continues until at least Spring of 2027.

The shift to mass surveillance would be notable enough even if it remained only a strategy of the intelligence community. It has not. Americans are awash in mass surveillance. Networks of automated license plate readers such as those offered by Flock and Vigilant Solutions blanket both public and private roadways and parking lots. These networks often allow searches by law enforcement, including across jurisdictions. They are, for example, being used to track people seeking abortions across state lines. Facial recognition tools, once the province of only the more elite parts of federal law enforcement, are increasingly used by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents on immigrants and protesters, in airports by the Transportation Security Administration, as well as by private entities. And, of course, modern phones track users’ locations constantly—and that information is readily available to law enforcement, often with only minimal process protections.

Constitutional Costs

Regardless of the murkiness of its actual usefulness, the shift from targeted to mass surveillance has profound implications for Americans’rights. It has created risks that have become increasingly evident, especially under the Trump administration.

At a basic level, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that citizens can be secure in their “persons, houses, papers and effects” from unreasonable searches. Warrants breaching that security should be supported by probable cause and particular descriptions of the place to be searched and items to be seized. Mass surveillance turns that promise on its head, allowing access to our “papers and effects” by the government without individualized suspicion or a particularized description of what data is being seized, much less probable cause. This protection was in response to colonial British misuse of writs of assistance, which authorized indiscriminate searches rather than targeted ones.

The justifications for exempting mass surveillance from constitutional protection vary. For Section 702, the government has taken the position that U.S. persons’ communications caught up in the dragnet, either due to overcollection or because they were communicating with someone outside the United States, do not require a warrant prior to initial collection or secondary access by the FBI and several other agencies. The argument is that if the initial collection was not aimed at Americans, the information is free from constitutional protection for any later uses, even for reasons far afield from the initial rationale for collection.

Other arguments rest on the claim that metadata is outside the Fourth Amendment, despite its demonstrated ability to reveal intimate details of all of our lives. Still others rest on the Supreme Court-created Third Party Doctrine, which holds that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to data shared with companies that provide us with services. Some turn on whether analysis by machine counts, claiming that only “human eyes” matter—a particularly troubling argument with the rise of artificial intelligence. What’s more, the government has used doctrines like standing to limit the ability of those subjected to mass surveillance to seek constitutional protection. No matter the argument, the goal is the same: to place the mechanisms and fruits of mass surveillance outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment.

The overarching truth is that, due to the concerted efforts by the government since 9/11, and the rise of technologies in recent years, the slice of Americans’ lives and data that are actually protected by the Fourth Amendment has shrunk significantly in the past 25 years. Together, with the technical capabilities of mass surveillance and the increased ability for that data to be analyzed using AI tools, the “security in our papers and effects” that the constitution promises seems increasingly illusory.

In addition to the Fourth Amendment, mass surveillance creates tensions with the First Amendment. The Constitution has long recognized that the right to freedom of speech requires a zone of privacy against governmental surveillance. The right to anonymous speech as well as the right of association both recognize the chilling effect that surveillance creates for people saying unpopular things or attempting to organize for political or other societal change. Mass surveillance grants the authorities the ability to track those people, both in real time and historically, that is inconsistent with actual techniques of freedom of speech and assembly.

That is why the recently released 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy is so troubling. On page seven, the White House expressly states that it intends to target domestic activists with its heretofore foreign-targeted powers. It says that the government “will prioritize the rapid identification and neutralization of violent secular political groups whose ideology is anti-American, radically pro-transgender and anarchist” and “will use all the tools constitutionally available to us to map them at home, identify their membership, map their ties to international organizations like Antifa.” While framed as targeting “violent” groups, it’s clear that the government intends to use its national security tools, presumably including the tools of mass surveillance, against Americans in ways that will create profound tensions with the First Amendment rights of people to organize and communicate privately.

Costs Due to Mistakes and Abuse

Even assuming some utility from mass surveillance—a fact we do not dispute, even if the public record is shaky and conclusory—the history of both the national security and domestic uses of mass surveillance confirms that these tools are inevitably misused, and that mistakes have impacted huge numbers of Americans. The past twenty-five years have demonstrated that it is not possible to surveil the entire US population while staying within the bounds of even a very generous legal framework like Section 702.

As Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) recently stated in discussion of Section 702 in an interview with Tech Policy Press: “backdoor searches have been used improperly for protestors, 19,000 campaign donors, members of Congress, journalists, government officials, a state court judge who had complained to the FBI about police misconduct. It has been abused substantially in the past.” The NSA experienced so much abuse of its mass surveillance tools by actual or aspiring romantic partners and ex-spouses that an internal name emerged for it: “LOVEINT,” or Love Intelligence.

That same pattern of abuse is now emerging at the domestic law enforcement level. A Texas police officer misused, and then lied about, using license plate readers to track a woman suspected of seeking an abortion. Multiple law enforcement officials have been accused of tracking people they either wished to have a relationship with or who were their exes. And mass surveillance technologies have been used to track both immigration targets and citizens engaging in their First Amendment-protected right to track and record the police.

Mistakes are inevitable with collections of data of this size and scope. The history of the FISA court’s reviews of Section 702 is littered with examples of the NSA not being able to follow its own rules limiting the scope of what it collects and analyzes, even after having been given multiple chances by the court. On the local level, the technical protections that Flock, for example, put in place have repeatedly been insufficient to stop “accidental” sharing its data with out-of-state law enforcement. These mistakes have fueled growing efforts by local communities across the country to remove license plate readers. Those efforts should be the first step in a broader reconsideration of mass surveillance.

More generally, ubiquitous surveillance carries a real societal cost. The chilling effects are real and pervasive, and they tend to fall hardest on the most marginalized members of society. Moreover, social progress requires the ability to experiment in secret. It’s hard to imagine a society progressing morally to the point of accepting and legalizing things like marijuana use or gay marriage if the earliest signs of that shift are snuffed out because of overzealous surveillance.

Reversing Course

While a cost-benefit analysis is not the best frame for deciding constitutional rights, it is a place to start to evaluate government policies. If the costs are too high and the benefits too small, what should the public do? While the policy and legal frameworks can be individually complex, mass surveillance is a problem in all of its applications. So too should solutions be comprehensive rather than piecemeal.

One comprehensive strategy is to reset the promise of the Fourth Amendment and recognize that a warrant is required prior to collection, access or use of information gathered through mass surveillance. This would apply to collections that include U.S. persons, whether done for national security or domestic purposes. This protection would apply regardless of whether the information is in the form of metadata. It would apply regardless of whether the information is held in homes or by services people rely on, such as telephones, internet or social network providers, or by private entities utilizing mass surveillance for their own purposes. By passing this legislation, Congress could ensure this rejection of mass surveillance, and include real enforcement such as a private right of action and an automatic exclusionary remedy in criminal prosecutions. The courts could also recognize this protection of “papers and effects” directly as a plain language interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.

There are already a number of efforts that take on pieces of mass surveillance. Section 702 has expired and should remain so. This was due largely to efforts to block the “back door” access to Section 702-collected data without warrants. The bipartisan “Fourth Amendment is Not for Sale Act” would prevent the government from purchasing data that it would otherwise need a warrant to obtain. The Supreme Court itself has already been chipping away at the Third Party Doctrine, with a recent step in the rejection of mass geofence warrants—warrants seeking the identities of individuals based upon their proximity to a crime—in Chatrie v. United States. Now, such warrants fall, at least initially, under the Fourth Amendment.

A more comprehensive approach would also address mass surveillance carried out by private companies, and to ensure that Americans have the right to encrypt and secure their data. There are many reasons the United States would benefit from a comprehensive privacy law—and curbing mass surveillance is one of them. Addressing mass surveillance is certainly one of them. Ideas such as the banning of secondary uses of data—with roots in the Fair Information Practice Principles from the 1970s—are worth pushing forward. So are moves such as creating fiduciary duties for mass data collectors. There are many more ways to curtail private companies’ mass surveillance while staying within constitutional boundaries. But addressing the costs of mass surveillance by both companies and governments is even more important in a world where AI agents are making decisions both about the public and on their behalf based on their data and observed behavior.

Twenty-five years after the U.S. government embraced mass surveillance, it’s time to evaluate it as a whole, and consider responses that address the problem as a whole. Americans must ask: Is it consistent with a self-governing democracy to have systems that watch everyone everywhere? Is the public comfortable with governments—federal, state, local—that seek to “know it all” about its citizens? Is the public comfortable with private mass surveillance in its own right and as it’s being increasingly used to fuel government surveillance? These questions have long needed serious consideration. But as it becomes increasingly evident that the Trump administration is using mass surveillance to keep itself in power, stifle dissent, and undermine political opponents, these questions are now more urgent than ever.

Cory Doctorow makes sense of wtf is happening with AI.

The Indiana Hoosiers football team, still-undefeated national champs (17-0 including last year and this one) take on the Howard Bison today at noon. I'll be watching. (It's on Fox One.)

John Venn has the perfect historical marker.

How Tony Pierce's busblog took off on 9/11.

I just added my thoughts to these thoughts by Eduardo Ordax. Said he,

My biggest concern about AI? That we all start sounding and thinking exactly the same.
We spend so much time talking about AI alignment. I worry about how much we’re aligning ourselves with it.
Same words. Same ideas. Same “unique perspectives.”
And scrolling through LinkedIn, I feel like it’s already happening.
I want AI to help me develop my thinking. I’m less excited about outsourcing what makes it mine.

Commented I,

How services trained on everybody and everything make everybody sound like everybody and as if they know everything about everything.

Not sure I'm right about that, but whatever.

VC Isn’t VC Anymore — Understanding the Rise of Cancer Capital. “We must understand that it is no longer a financial machine that is used to fund startups, but a political and social machine focused on dismantling democracy and civil society.”

“The hardest thing about being alive is that we exist as accidents of chance, and the universe does not hand us meaning. Nobody and nothing will give us meaning. We have to make it. And I think love is an instrument for how to do that.”
— Maria Popova

From a beautiful conversation between Debbie Millman and Maria Popova.

We really, really need to talk about venture capital. Because it’s not “venture capital” anymore.

There’s a huge disconnect between what most people think of VC, where an investor has a big fund and cuts checks to help a founder build a company, and the current reality, where a handful of billionaire extremists use the cover of “VC” to advance an outrageous agenda where they’re accountable to no one.

I’m gonna explain this from a standpoint that almost never gets articulated: I’ve personally raised tens of millions of dollars in venture capital funding as CEO of startups, and been directly involved as a board member or advisor in raising hundreds of millions more. I’ve sat in board rooms, across the table from the people I’m talking about here, or been at the industry events that they frequent. So this isn’t sour grapes because these VCs wouldn’t cut me a check, or some chip on my shoulder about these investors due to a business deal. This is what I know about these bad actors because I’m part of the community of creators and inventors who build the things that they used to invest in — back when they still cared about innovation.

Many of the trends in society and politics that people are most angry about, from data centers being forced down everyone’s throats, to all of our favorite apps and services being enshittified, to politicians being paid to ignore the will of the people, are all being supercharged by these cancer capitalists. They have warped the structure of venture capital into a form of oligarchy that answers to no market, no regulators, and no voters. So it’s worth understanding exactly how they did it.

How Venture Capital became Cancer Capital

I’ll be breaking these points down in further detail, but just to begin framing the concept, I’ll lay out the core idea here in some bullet points (so that you’re not tempted to run this whole thing through an LLM):

• Venture capital was only supposed to be a tiny segment of the overall capital market, but it has expanded to become the primary form of funding that new companies consider — it was never the only way, and it didn’t used to be the default one
• VC was meant to be a small percentage of overall investment because it represents the high-risk, high-reward part of a portfolio; to be healthy, most of a portfolio — or most of an economy — needs to focus on assets that are more stable and predictable. But a cancer grows from a cell that a body needs in small, healthy amounts, and that turns deadly when it grows without limit until it harms, or even kills, its host.
• As regulations have gotten looser in recent years, a handful of venture capital firms have become “do everything” funds that combine private equity with their existing VC businesses, and expand to manage massive stockpiles of tens of billions of dollars
• The 1% of VC firms that get this big stop being exposed to the risk in their own investments at all — when you collect 2% a year to manage $50 billion, that’s a billion dollars landing in your pocket annually whether any company you funded lives or dies. Those firms also stop legally even being venture capital firms, making them unaccountable to markets, founders, or the law — and that’s how they become “Cancer Capital”
• Meanwhile, the 99% of “normal” VCs don’t have the power or funding of the Cancer Capital firms, but are forced to play on the field that those firms define, even if they don’t like the way they do business
• Since the Cancer Capital firms have become so powerful, the overall balance of power between founders and VCs has flipped; instead of founders having a company that VCs would try to fund, now VCs publish extremist political manifestos, and “founders” are just the people who are selected to carry out parts of those plans
• The rest of the world doesn’t know: New founders and workers entering the tech industry are unaware that Cancer Capital has taken over, so many are still trying to play by the old rules, and can’t figure out why their ideas are being pushed into serving the goals of the Cancer Capital firms
• Politicians and media still look at VC as if it works like it did 10 or 20 years ago, and cheer them on like they’re funding job creation or enabling new companies to grow, when their primary goal is concentrating power and wealth into the hands of the Cancer Capital tycoons. They keep getting fooled by this, over and over.
• These days, venture firms are increasingly getting their funds from pension funds and retail retirement accounts, meaning the public (you!) are increasingly holding the bag for the parts of their portfolios that actually have some risk, even if you never intentionally made that choice
• The shift away from IPOs in the tech industry has also encouraged these Cancer Capital firms to find ways to cash out long before companies ever go public, meaning they can make a massive return off of companies that never make a penny of profit, even if regular investors get screwed by the stock of a company once it actually gets listed on the public stock market.
• Part of why this has gotten so corrupt is the way the Cancer Capital firms have transformed themselves into their post-VC forms. Because they’re not legally VC firms anymore, they’re free to buy shares directly from founders, or hold unlimited amounts of publicly-traded stock — exactly what they couldn’t do as regular VCs. They can even sell their investment in a company as an asset to another one of their own funds, and then book the increase in value as a profit, all without the company ever having made a penny. Another racket: a company that’s raised a bunch of cash in a funding round can buy out its early investors if they’re one of these post-VCs, so they can get paid off even if their portfolio company has never made a penny in profits or revenues.

All of this self-dealing, and the way that they’re isolated from any accountability, has made these firms become more and more shameless in their behavior. Former Andreessen Horowitz partner John O’Farrell publicly called out the firm (a rarity — the company is notoriously vindictive towards those who it decides are disloyal) for what he called its “political infiltration” of AI policy. Marc Andreessen, Ben Horowitz and their firm have put $115.3 million into this midterm cycle — nearly double their $63 million in 2024, and more than any other billionaire donor in the country, even including Elon Musk. Molly White, whose Tech Influence Watch tracks this money against FEC filings, shows that a16z alone accounts for more than 20% of all political contributions from the entire cohort of crypto and AI companies it follows. And they’re funneling these funds to candidates in both parties. This is a huge escalation from the tentative baby steps that folks like Zuckerberg were making in the Obama era, working on benign issues like trying to help immigrants.

And of course, it gets a lot worse than just their lobbying. As I have frequently noted, Andreessen Horowitz hired a man as a partner at their firm despite his having no background or qualifications in tech, finance, or startups whatsoever. His only discernible qualification was that he had choked my unarmed neighbor Jordan Neely to death on a subway car.

This is how brazen, how toxic and destructive, we’ve allowed the industry formerly known as venture capital to become. We must understand that it is no longer a financial machine that is used to fund startups, but a political and social machine focused on dismantling democracy and civil society. And it’s time to act accordingly.

Up next: we’ll dive into the specifics of many of the points laid out above, to understand more about how we got here.

Today's links

• Unpermissioned research: Fighting Trump means preserving the internet, which means scraping.
• Hey look at this: Delights to delectate.
• Object permanence: Leaked advanced PalmOS device specs; Stalwart workers; "I, Rowboat"; SMS uprising; Facebook v switching costs; Capitalism of fools.
• Upcoming appearances: Dąbrowa Górnicza, Warsaw, Brighton, London, Budapest, South Bend, Hudson, Victoria, Vancouver.
• Recent appearances: Where I've been.
• Latest books: You keep readin' em, I'll keep writin' 'em.
• Upcoming books: Like I said, I'll keep writin' 'em.
• Colophon: All the rest.

Unpermissioned research (permalink)

After half a century of neoliberalism, we are all drenched in capitalism's established religion, the worship of property rights. We are so marinated in property worship that even capitalism's critics frame their critiques in "property talk," to the exclusion of other, more important rights, like human rights, labor rights and privacy rights.

To do this is to surrender before the battle even starts. Critics lose when they allow oligarchs and their apologists to choose a battlefield where they have a nearly unbeatable advantage.

Take privacy: privacy is a human right, not a property right. Human rights aren't for sale. You can't sell yourself into slavery, you can't sell your kidneys to make the rent. If privacy is a property right – one that can be traded away – then Facebook's industrial-scale privacy invasions are actually fine, since you "traded" your privacy to Mark Zuckerberg in exchange for the privilege of talking to your friends.

Some self-styled critics of tech monopolists say that the answer to Facebook's privacy invasions is to force the company to pay for your privacy with cash, rather than services:

https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-andrew-yangs-plan-to-pay-you-for-your-data-doesnt-add-up/

This is ideological capture in its purest form: the "data dividend" that Facebook would owe you under this system amounts to a few dollars per year. For wealthy people, the sums would be trivial, while working people, who've been on the downward leg of every K-shaped recovery for a quarter century, who've maxed out their credit cards and re-mortgaged their homes and drive Uber on the weekends to make rent, would have to subject themselves to ongoing surveillance.

That surveillance is already used to determine the highest price those working people will pay – companies like Plexure inform fast food places when you've just gotten paid so they can tack an extra dollar onto your breakfast burrito in the app:

https://pluralistic.net/2026/04/30/something-must-be-done/#there-ive-done-something

Being forced to sell your privacy doesn't just raise the prices you pay, it also lowers the wages you earn. The same people who can't afford this "pay or privacy" system have their private data used to calculate the lowest wage they'll accept for each ride on those weekend Uber shifts:

https://pluralistic.net/2024/12/18/loose-flapping-ends/#luigi-has-a-point

In other words: not being able to afford privacy will result in you having even less disposable income, which will mean that you'll have to sell even more of your privacy. Lather, rinse, repeat.

But even the wealthy people who can afford to forego the pittances Facebook and others offer in exchange for their private information will find privacy elusive. That's because private information isn't a "rival good" – a thing only one person can own at a time. The fact that your mother is your mother "belongs" to both you and her, as well as your grandparents, your father, your siblings and your kids. The fact that you don't sell your family tree to a tech company won't stop all those other people from selling it on – as anyone whose foolish relations handed their genome over to 23andme can attest:

https://www.npr.org/2025/03/24/nx-s1-5338622/23andme-bankruptcy-genetic-data-privacy

In the property religion, the way you can tell if something is valuable is if it has a high price. Property cultists insist that the problem with privacy is that our privacy is being sold too cheaply. They're wrong: private information isn't "mispriced" – it shouldn't be priced.

Human beings are the most valuable things in our world and they are literally priceless. Murder isn't "theft of life." Rape isn't "theft of sex." While insurers and civil courts have ways of calculating the "price" of an injury or violation, great care has been taken over the centuries to ensure that this does not turn human beings into commodities. You can't buy a "murder offset" that lets you kill people provided you pay into a fund that saves a human somewhere else:

https://pluralistic.net/2021/04/14/for-sale-green-indulgences/#killer-analogy

Human beings are too valuable to be priced. We have an entire, sui generis way of balancing the conflicting interests of human rights. My daughter and wife have rights over me, I have rights over them, and when those rights come into conflict – say, if my daughter believes I can no longer care for myself and wants to put me in a care home – the process for resolving that conflict isn't an auction:

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2008/feb/21/intellectual.property

Your kids aren't your property. In fact, all the most important relationships in your life are non-market. Doctors have patients, not customers. Any time a doctor calls you a "customer" they are demoting you. A doctor doesn't sell you health. You have rights as a patient that far exceed the rights accruing to a mere customer. Same goes for other professions: Teachers have pupils, librarians have patrons, lawyers have clients. "Customer" is a demotion from all of these.

As every "user agreement" you've ever clicked through demonstrates, Big Tech loves to have everything defined in property terms – and so does all big business.

Take the fight over scraping for AI. You might think that this is a fight over the economic rights of creative workers – certainly, my fellow creative workers treat it as such. But because this debate is being framed in terms of property rights, rather than labor rights, this is a fight that workers are set up to lose.

The tell here is how the media companies – who have been eroding the wages of creative workers for decades as they consolidated into a curdled, inbred oligopoly – describe the AI companies' scraping: as an unlicensed taking. Mitch Glazier, the $1.4m/year CEO of the Recording Industry Association of America issues press releases decrying AI training for image generators without negotiating a license fee first:

https://pluralistic.net/2026/03/03/its-a-trap-2/#inheres-at-the-moment-of-fixation

Who's Mitch Glazier? Oh, just a former Congressional staffer who was drummed out of the Capitol Building after he snuck a clause into must-pass legislation that would have transferred hundreds of millions of dollars from musicians to record labels, who was then immediately hired as the CEO of the record industry's largest lobbying group:

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/tpps-attack-artists-termination-rights

Mitch Glazier – and the businesses he represents – aren't opposed to AI replacing artists. They're opposed to AI replacing media companies. Remember the Hollywood writers' strike? The proposal to replace screenwriters with chatbots didn't come from OpenAI, it came from Disney, Warner, Universal and other companies who claim that AI training is "theft."

If AI training is "theft," then it can be cured by making a purchase, something that the AI companies can easily afford, thanks to the hundreds of billions of dollars they have been given by the world's richest investors, who are the high priests and cardinals of the property religion.

The Hollywood writers are the only workers in the world who have successfully beaten back the use of AI in their workplace, and they didn't do it by making recourse to property rights. The Writers Guild is a union and it enjoys a weak form of "sectoral bargaining" (where all the workers in a field bargain with all the businesses at once) called "multi-employer bargaining":

https://pluralistic.net/2023/10/01/how-the-writers-guild-sunk-ais-ship/

The Hollywood writers' strike was an unqualified victory for the writers, who defended their labor rights to co-determination when it came to the use of new tools on their jobsite. Under the terms of their hard-fought contract, screenwriters don't have to use AI, but they can if they want. For example, writers on a long-running sitcom might train an AI with every script in the series' history, so they can ask a chatbot continuity questions as they beat out a new season of the show. But they don't have to do this if they don't want to, and even if they do, neither their wages nor their headcount can be reduced.

The media companies insist that scraping is a copyright violation, that it's "theft." As a matter of law, this is far from obvious or settled: the process of making transient copies of many works, performing mathematical analysis on them, and then publishing that analysis as software is not obviously a copyright violation, and anyone who claims otherwise doesn't understand copyright:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/02/09/ai-monkeys-paw/#bullied-schoolkids

Worse: by demoting a labor rights issue to a mere property rights issue, AI critics are setting workers up to fail. Say the issue with AI training really is mere copyright. If that's so, the media companies who want nothing better than to pauperize creative workers can amend their standard contracts so that any worker who does business with them must irrevocably transfer their "AI training rights" to the company.

Then, that company will absolutely, 100% license those rights to an AI company to create a model designed to replace that worker. The company will get paid for the training, and the resulting model will come with "guardrails" to stop other media companies from using proprietary data to compete with it.

This is the story of the past 50 years of copyright expansion: every new copyright we've created "to help artists" was scooped up by their bosses, who grew more powerful and were able to demand more concessions from those artists, who were therefore poorer and thus needed more copyrights to help them (lather, rinse, repeat):

https://pluralistic.net/2026/08/18/enron-corpus/#sign-here

If creative workers' AI fight is merely a copyright fight, then that fight can only determine whether media companies or tech companies will get the biggest portion when those workers are devoured by corporations. Only a labor rights fight can take creative workers off the menu altogether.

Treating AI training as "theft" creates harms whose blast radius extends well beyond creative workers' livelihoods. Scraping is a hugely beneficial activity. If scraping – taking a vast corpus of copyrighted works without permission – is theft, then every search engine is a crime, unless it can afford to license "search indexing rights" from every site on the internet.

There's exactly one company that could pull that off: Google, a rapacious tech monopolist that is – not coincidentally – one of the leaders of the movement to beggar every creative worker. We will not improve the world, the internet, or creative workers' lives by ensuring that the last search engine anyone ever creates is Google.

Remember our earlier discussion of how privacy violations are weaponized to make poor people even poorer, by depressing their wages and raising prices based on inferences about their economic desperation? Our best weapon for fighting this practice is scraping, because that's how we catch corporations changing prices and wages based on surveillance data:

https://pluralistic.net/2023/09/17/how-to-think-about-scraping/

Scraping is how we produce evidence of the changes that powerful people are making to the world around us. Do you want to know whether Mark Zuckerberg or Elon Musk are downranking content critical of Trump and Big Tech and pumping racist and conspiratorial posts into the resulting void? You'd better hope you can scrape the feeds they cram into billions of people's eyeballs. Same goes for keeping track of genocide apologists, data-center astroturfers and ICE cheerleaders who've flooded Tiktok ever since Trump stole it and handed it over to his creepy billionaire pal Larry Ellison.

Making copies of that stuff isn't theft. It's not a copyright violation. Not even if you do it to billions of works. Not even if it's bad for the companies whose feeds you're capturing. Not even if it's bad for the dark money groups who funded the content.

Sure, if you do this carelessly or recklessly, you can end up violating someone's labor rights, or privacy rights, or human rights. And because those frameworks aren't based on the sanctity of property rights, they can be used to protect these important rights without giving corporate America the right to have you fined or arrested for documenting their takeover of the America.

The people who keep track of this stuff are worried about being fined or arrested. Ethan Zuckerman, one of America's foundational internet scholars, has just accepted Canadian government funding to move his lab from UMass to McGill in Montreal:

https://ethanzuckerman.com/2026/08/27/my-personal-contribution-to-the-us-canada-trade-war/

Zuckerman studies platform power: "using data to answer hard questions about social media, search engines and AI tools." He leads a team that is documenting exactly, precisely how tech companies collude with authoritarians to spy on us, manipulate us, and control us. And his methodology is something called "unpermissioned research," which is what academics call scraping:

https://www.techpolicy.press/ai-companies-threaten-independent-social-media-research/

"Unpermissioned research" seeks to circumvent limits that platforms establish specifically to stop outsiders from learning how they operate. When you're doing unpermissioned research, you try to get around rate limits, query throttles, and other measures that platforms use to block others from mapping their extent and documenting their conduct.

"Unpermissioned research" isn't a free-for-all. Universities have ethical rules designed to protect the privacy rights and other human rights of research subjects, and because these aren't property rights, they can be balanced against the socially beneficial outcomes of research. Universities can get this wrong, of course, but when they do, it's not theft. It's a human rights violation, a privacy violation, a labor violation.

If you want to know how AI companies are trying to destroy creators' livelihoods, you have to scrape the AI companies. You can't ask companies for permission to gather information that might be used to destroy them – they'll just say no. If taking information off the internet without permission is "theft," then gathering information by scraping AI companies is also theft.

Sometimes a tech company will set up a "research portal" that supposedly obviates the need to scrape by putting all the relevant information in one convenient place. That's what Facebook did in the wake of the 2016 election, when it was widely condemned for publishing paid political disinformation. But Facebook's official research portal omitted vast amounts of paid political disinformation, something we only know because NYU set up a scraping project called Ad Observer that documented the discrepancy:

https://pluralistic.net/2021/08/06/get-you-coming-and-going/#potemkin-research-program

Facebook used legal threats to kill Ad Observer, and then…they killed their official research portal, too:

https://pluralistic.net/2021/07/15/three-wise-zucks-in-a-trenchcoat/#inconvenient-truth

Zuckerman is one of dozens of leading US academics who are relocating their labs and teams to Canadian universities, citing fear of political interference from the Trump regime:

https://vancouver.citynews.ca/2026/08/27/canada-recruits-dozens-of-foreign-scientists-researchers-poaching-many-from-u-s/

The Canadian government has committed $504m to the project. Some of that research will help Canada develop new green energy, and some of it will help Canada make important medical breakthroughs. But Zuckerman's research has a special place in the portfolio of Canadian research projects, because – thanks to scraping – it is a leading source of information about how Trump's tech companies are waging war on the American people and the world.

Scraping isn't theft of data, just like murder isn't theft of life. Scraping can be harmful, and we can create laws and social regimes and ways of talking about those harms that don't give authoritarian governments and vast multinational corporations the right to decide who can document and analyze their conduct.

Take Wikipedia: the project exists solely to organize and disseminate information, for free, to everyone in the world. Wikipedia is among the most important parts of the internet, and one of the most positive developments of the 21st century. The entire project is licensed under a generous Creative Commons license that encourages unlimited commercial re-use of its contents. Even if you think scraping copyrighted works is theft, scraping Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 works is unquestionably not theft.

But Wikipedia is being hammered by AI scrapers, which are operating so aggressively that they threaten the project's ability to keep its servers online. Wikipedia has an AI problem, but that AI problem isn't "theft" – it's denial of service, the aggressive act of intentionally or recklessly flooding a server with so much traffic that it crashes.

If you've been lured into a cultlike worship of property rights, this seems like a contradiction. But once you relegate the relatively unimportant matter of property rights to its correct station, you can see – and reason about – the universe of rights that are far more important than mere property.

All it takes is realizing that there are far worse things you can do with information than "stealing" it.

(Image: Bearas, CC BY-SA 4.0, modified)

Hey look at this (permalink)

• Meta's $17 Billion Settlement is a Bad Deal for Teens and All Social Media Users https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/09/metas-17-billion-settlement-bad-deal-teens-and-all-social-media-users

• New Twitter launches, says Musk’s X gave up the name https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2026/08/new-twitter-launches-says-musks-x-gave-up-the-name/

• For The Economist, Mentioning Workers’ Interests Is Heresy https://jacobin.com/2026/08/acemoglu-economics-ai-automation-working-class

• How Youth and Educators Can Fight Enshittified Tech https://clalliance.org/blog/how-youth-and-educators-can-fight-enshittified-tech/

• Stalking the Wily Hacker: 40 years later – Cliff Stoll https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=656058JxTM0

Object permanence (permalink)

#25yrsago NYT says ebooks don't exist, fails to mention thriving ebook pirate scene https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/28/business/forecasts-of-an-e-book-era-were-it-seems-premature.html

#25yrsago Parking tickets waived in exchange for written apologies https://web.archive.org/web/20010826013513/http://www.thesmokinggun.com/doc_o_day/lewiston1.shtml

#20yrsago "I, Row-Boat" https://web.archive.org/web/20060000000000*/http://www.flurb.net/1/doctorow.htm

#20yrsago Filipino students use SMS to organize mass demonstrations https://web.archive.org/web/20060902160514/http://blog.wired.com/sterling/index.blog%3Fentry_id%3D1545927

#20yrsago Spam pump-and-dumps work http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5284618.stm

#25yrsago Leaked: Handspring's next PalmOS device https://web.archive.org/web/20020824213501/http://www.palmstation.com/view_article.asp?article=4614

#15yrsago “Stalwart Workers”: neglected backbone of the firm https://web.archive.org/web/20110920155246/http://blogs.hbr.org/hbsfaculty/2011/08/stop-ignoring-the-stalwart-wor.html

#5yrsago Facebook's war on switching costs https://pluralistic.net/2021/08/28/talking-hard-work-blues/#hostage-takers

#5yrsago The "work ethic" is a dirty trick we play on ourselves https://pluralistic.net/2021/08/28/talking-hard-work-blues/#work-will-set-you-free

#1yrago The capitalism of fools https://pluralistic.net/2025/08/28/strew-deal/#neither-fish-nor-fowla

Upcoming appearances (permalink)

• Dąbrowa Górnicza, Kongres Regeneracja! to interdyscyplinarna, Sep 5
  https://regeneracja.plse.org.pl/

• Warsaw: Romana i Jana Podoskich, Sep 6
  https://wydarzenia.phub.pl/events/0ee0e198-f843-423a-890f-c84ff50a46c0

• Brighton: The Reverse Centaur's Guide to Life After AI with Carole Cadwalladr (Brighton Dome), Sep 8
  https://brightondome.org/whats-on/LSC-cory-doctorow-the-reverse-centaurs-guide-to-life-after-ai/

• London: The Reverse Centaur's Guide to Life After AI with Riley Quinn (Foyle's Picadilly), Sep 9
  https://www.foyles.co.uk/events/enshittification-cory-doctorow-riley-quinn

• Budapest: Brain Bar, Sep 17
  https://brainbar.com/munkatars/cory-doctorow

• South Bend: An Evening With Cory Doctorow (Notre Dame), Oct 6
  https://franco.nd.edu/events/2026/10/06/an-evening-with-cory-doctorow/

• Hudson, OH: Hudson Library, Oct 7
  https://engagedpatrons.org/EventsExtended.cfm?SiteID=3850&EventID=596952&PK=

• Victoria: Munro's Books, Oct 20
  https://www.munrobooks.com/events/6113620261020

• Vancouver: BC Policy Solutions Gala, Nov 12
  https://bcpolicy.ca/gala/

Recent appearances (permalink)

• How Tech Platforms Took Over the Economy (Dystopia Now)
  https://sites.libsyn.com/566555/enshittification-and-reverse-centaurs-cory-doctorow-on-how-tech-platforms-took-over-the-economy

• Hope, AI, Fixing the Internet and the Reverse Centaur of it all (Wilosophy)
  https://podcastaddict.com/everyone-relax/episode/231414816

• Deflating the AI Bubble (Do Not Pass Go)
  https://www.donotpassgo.ca/p/deflating-the-ai-bubble-with-cory

• Technofeudal Enshittification (Fucking Cancelled)
  https://www.fuckingcancelled.com/p/technofeudal-enshittification-with

• Who The Machine Serves (EFF)
  https://archive.org/details/effecting-change-who-the-machine-serves

Latest books (permalink)

• "The Reverse-Centaur's Guide to AI," a short book about being a better AI critic, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, June 2026
  https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374621568/thereversecentaursguidetolifeafterai/

• "Canny Valley": A limited edition collection of the collages I create for Pluralistic, self-published, September 2025 https://pluralistic.net/2025/09/04/illustrious/#chairman-bruce

• "Enshittification: Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It," Farrar, Straus, Giroux, October 7 2025
  https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374619329/enshittification/

• "Picks and Shovels": a sequel to "Red Team Blues," about the heroic era of the PC, Tor Books (US), Head of Zeus (UK), February 2025 (https://us.macmillan.com/books/9781250865908/picksandshovels).

• "The Bezzle": a sequel to "Red Team Blues," about prison-tech and other grifts, Tor Books (US), Head of Zeus (UK), February 2024 (thebezzle.org).

• "The Lost Cause:" a solarpunk novel of hope in the climate emergency, Tor Books (US), Head of Zeus (UK), November 2023 (http://lost-cause.org).

• "The Internet Con": A nonfiction book about interoperability and Big Tech (Verso) September 2023 (http://seizethemeansofcomputation.org). Signed copies at Book Soup (https://www.booksoup.com/book/9781804291245).

• "Red Team Blues": "A grabby, compulsive thriller that will leave you knowing more about how the world works than you did before." Tor Books http://redteamblues.com.

• "Chokepoint Capitalism: How to Beat Big Tech, Tame Big Content, and Get Artists Paid, with Rebecca Giblin", on how to unrig the markets for creative labor, Beacon Press/Scribe 2022 https://chokepointcapitalism.com

Upcoming books (permalink)

• "The Post-American Internet," a geopolitical sequel of sorts to Enshittification, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2027

• "Unauthorized Bread": a middle-grades graphic novel adapted from my novella about refugees, toasters and DRM, FirstSecond, April 20, 2027

• "Enshittification, Why Everything Suddenly Got Worse and What to Do About It" (the graphic novel), Firstsecond, 2027

• "The Memex Method," Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2027

Colophon (permalink)

Today's top sources:

Currently writing:

• “Once Is Enemy Action,” a science fiction novel about the origins of modern technofascism. Today's words: 527 (10843 total).

• "The Post-American Internet," a sequel to "Enshittification," about the better world the rest of us get to have now that Trump has torched America. Fourth draft completed. Submitted to editor.

• A Little Brother short story about DIY insulin PLANNING

This work – excluding any serialized fiction – is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. That means you can use it any way you like, including commercially, provided that you attribute it to me, Cory Doctorow, and include a link to pluralistic.net.

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